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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., a
Delaware corporation,

t

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 020903207

vs.
VISUAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah
corporation, ERLAND REBER, an
:
individual, and SHARLENE REBER,
an individual,
:
Defendants•

:

This matter came before the Court for hearing on November 6,
2002, in connection with the defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

At

the conclusion of the hearing, the Court indicated that it would
take the matter under advisement to further consider the arguments,
the relevant case law and statutes and the written submissions of
the parties.

Since taking the Motion under advisement, the Court

has had an opportunity to consider or reconsider the law, all
relevant pleadings, facts and the oral arguments in this case. Now
being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum
Decision.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The defendants have filed their Motion to Dismiss, contending
that they are not liable to the plaintiff under their 1986
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Guaranty, because the debt at issue was incurred by an entirely
different entity than the entity whose payment they did guaranty.
The plaintiff focuses on the fact that the guarantee was not
revoked and

continues to be in effect regardless of the changes

(in terms of name or officers involved) to Visual Technology, Inc.
At the outset, the Court notes that there was some issue about
whether the Court would treat the defendants1 Motion as one for
summary judgment. The Court reiterates its initial decision to not
convert the defendants' Motion. Therefore, the only materials that
the Court referred to in making its decision are the Complaint and
the documents attached thereto.

Having reviewed the factual

allegations of the Complaint and the accompanying documents, the
Court determines that there are no facts under which the plaintiff
can seek to hold the Reber defendants liable under the Guaranty for
debts incurred by an entity which is entirely different than the
one they guaranteed payment from.
Specifically, as the defendants1 counsel clearly articulated
during oral argument, this case does not involve a change in the
financial structure or organization of Debtor that is the subject
of the Guaranty, but rather a new debtor altogether, one that was
not covered by the Guaranty in the first place. What we have here
are two parallel corporations who happen to share the same name.
The first, the corporation whose obligations the Rebers guaranteed,
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is no longer in existence.
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The second is a wholly different

corporation which was formerly known as Dunston-Hill.
The documents attached to the plaintifffs Complaint evidence
that the plaintiff entered into a Reseller Agreement with the new
debtor, Visual Technology, Inc. (II) on August 1, 2001.

The

address for this new debtor differs from the Debtor referenced in
the Guaranty. From that point, it appears that the plaintiff dealt
with the signatory to that Agreement, Mr. Jackson, and mailed
correspondence to the new address.

(See letter dated January 10,

2002, from Mr. Cheng to Mr. Jackson) . These facts demonstrate that
this case is clearly distinguishable from Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v.
White. 438 Utah Adv.Rep. 5 (Utah App. 2002), which the plaintiff
strongly relies on.

The guarantor in Mule-Hide had not revoked

her guarantee when the company that was the subject of her
guarantee

placed

an

order

from

Mule-Hide,

subsequently delivered and accepted.

which

order

was

The facts in this case

demonstrate that it was not the company that the Rebers guaranteed
that had ordered and received products from the plaintiff, the debt
for which is the subject of this action. Rather, it was the Visual
Technology, Inc. (II), located at Bearcat Drive, whose president
was Mr. Jackson, that ordered the products pursuant to an entirely
new Agreement that the Rebers were not even parties to. Under the
facts alleged in the Complaint and in light of the documents
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attached to the Complaint, there is no plausible way that the
Rebers can be held liable undetr the Guaranty.

Accordingly, the

Court grants the Rebers1 Motion to Dismiss•
Counsel for the Rebers is to prepare an Order consistent with
this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to the Court for
review and signature.
Dated this

/ -day of January,

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
January, 2003:

David Leta
Kimberly Havlik
Attorneys for Plaintiff
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Elizabeth M. Peck
Attorney for Defendant
350 South 400 East, Suite 101A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COURT'S RULING

SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., a
Delaware corporation,

CASE NO. 020903207

Plaintiff,
vs.
VISUAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah
corporation, ERLAND REBER, an
individual, and SHARLENE REBER,
an individual,
Defendants.

The Court has before it the Reply Memorandum filed by the
plaintiff in support of its Objection to Proposed Order on Motion
to Dismiss.

The prior Court's Ruling, dated April 22, 2003, gave

the plaintiff an opportunity to reply to the defendants' contention
that they have a legal basis for seeking attorney's fees, raised
for the first time in an opposition to Sony's Objection.
now

reviewed

the Objection,

the defendants' Response

Having
and

the

recently filed Reply, the Court determines that the Rebers are
entitled to attorney's fees under the Guaranty.
First, the Court addresses Sony's argument that the defendants
are not entitled to recover attorney's fees under the Guaranty
because they successfully argued that the Guaranty is unenforceable
in this case.

To reiterate, this Court's decision was that the
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defendants could not be held liable under the Guaranty, under these
specific set of facts.
illogical

conclusion

Sony is extrapolating this decision to the
that

the

entire

Guaranty

(including

attorney's fees provision) is no longer enforceable.
of the parties acknowledged

that

the

Clearly, all

the Guaranty was

because the Rebers had failed to properly revoke it.

enforceable
In fact, the

Guaranty remains operative and could again impose guaranty duties
upon the Rebers if the entity whose performance was guaranteed
began to accrue debts

from Sony.

Despite

the

fact

that

the

Guaranty remains enforceable, the Court found that the Rebers were
still

not

liable under

unrelated entity.

the Guaranty

for debts

accrued

by

an

Therefore, contrary to Sony's assertions, the

defendants did not (and could not) have "sought a ruling that no
cause of action can ever exist [under the Guaranty] , under any set
of facts."

Instead, the ruling was limited to the set of facts

before the Court.
Having found that the Guaranty remains operative, the Court
also concludes that the attorney's fee provision in the Guaranty
together with the reciprocal fee statute (Utah Code Annotated §7827-56.5)

provide

the

defendants

with

an

avenue

for

seeking

attorney's fees. Sony is correct that this statute establishes a
discretionary standard for awarding fees.
not persuaded by Sony's argument

However, the Court is

that the defendants'

alleged

^ L
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failure to comply with certain notice provisions in the Guaranty is
a reasonable basis to deny attorney's fees altogether.

While it is

true that the defendants did not formally revoke their Guaranty,
the documents attached to Sony's Complaint evidence its awareness
that it was dealing with a new entity under a separate Reseller
Agreement.

Therefore, the failure to revoke is not the type of

egregious conduct that would warrant this Court declining to award
attorney's fees in spite of a clear contractual and statutory basis
for awarding such fees.
Objection.

Accordingly, the Court denies Sony's

The defendants are to re-submit their proposed Order,

with the inclusion of attorney's fees.
This Court's Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court,
denying Sony's Objection.

^-1-1
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this \

day of June,

2003:

David Leta
Kimberly Havlik
Attorneys for Plaintiff
15 W. South Temple, Suite 12 0 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Elizabeth M. Peck
Attorney for Defendant
350 South 400 East, Suite 101A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ELIZABETH M. PECK (6304)
350 So. 400 East, Ste. 101A
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
tel. (801) 521-6737
fax (801) 359-2811

SEP 25 2003
By

——-HOEI___
/

Deputy Clerk

Attorney for Defendants
Erland and Sharlene Reber

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DIV. I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., a Delaware
corporation,
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
vs.
VISUAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah
corporation, ERLAND REBER, an
individual, and SHARLENE REBER, an
individual,

:

Defendants.

:

Case No. 020903207
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants Erland and Sharlene Reberfs Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint against them
came on for hearing before the Court, Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding, on November 6, 2002.
Present and appearing with and on behalf of the Rebers was their counsel Elizabeth M. Peck, and
present and appearing for Plaintiff Sony Electronics, Inc. was its counsel of record, David E. Leta and
Kimberly A. Havlik of Snell & Wilmer. Following oral argument from counsel, this Court took the
matter under advisement to consider further the arguments and written submissions of the parties,
relevant case law and statutes, all relevant pleadings, facts and the oral arguments in this case. Having
been fully advised and good cause appearing therefor, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision on

January 7, 2003 from which it makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW and ORDER:
At the hearing, the issue of whether this Court would treat the Rebers' Motion to Dismiss as
one for summary judgment was raised. This Court reiterates its decision not to convert the Motion to
Dismiss to a summary judgment motion as no new matters outside the pleading were raised by the
Motion, and as such, the Court considered only the Complaint and the documents attached to it in
making this decision.
Findings of Fact:
1.

The Complaint alleges, inter alia, that the Rebers were liable to Plaintiff for certain

debts incurred by the above named co-defendant Visual Technology, Inc. under a Guaranty
Agreement executed by the Rebers in favor of Plaintiff in 1989 (the "Guaranty").
2.

The Rebers filed their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), contending that they are not liable to Plaintiff under the Guaranty because the debt forming
the basis for Plaintiffs Complaint was incurred by a wholly separate entity than the entity whose debts
were the subject of the Guaranty.
3.

The relief requested by the Rebers1 Motion to Dismiss, and supporting Memorandum

was for both a dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint against them and for the award their reasonable
attorney's fees and costs.
4.

In opposing the Rebers' Motion, Plaintiffs focus on the fact that the Rebers did not

revoke the Guaranty and it therefore continues in effect regardless of changes to Visual Technology in
terms of its officers and name.
5.

In this case, there are two parallel corporations who share the same name.
2

an

6.

This first corporation, Visual Technology (I) no longer exists. It is the corporation

whose debts the Rebers guaranteed.
7.

The second corporation, Visual Technology (II), is a wholly separate corporation

which was formerly known as Dunston-Hill.
8.

The documents attached to the Complaint evidence that Plaintiff entered into a Reseller

Agreement with the new debtor Visual Technology (II) on August 1, 2001. The address for the new
debtor is different from the address of the debtor, Visual Technology (I), referenced in the Guaranty.
9.

From the date of the Reseller Agreement on August 1, 2001, it appears that Plaintiffs

correspondence to Visual Technology was mailed to the new address and that Plaintiff dealt with the
signatory to the Reseller Agreement, Mr. Bruce Jackson. (See letter dated 1/10/2002 from Mr. Cheng
to Mr. Jackson.)
10.

This case does not involve a change in the financial structure or organization of the

debtor which is the subject of the Guaranty, Visual Technology (I). It involves a new debtor
altogether, Visual Technology (II), which was not covered by the Guaranty in the first place.
Conclusions of Law:
11.

Based upon the factual allegations of the Complaint and the accompanying documents,

the Court determines that there are no facts under which Plaintiff can attempt to hold the Rebers liable
under the Guaranty for debts incurred by Visual Technology (II), an entity which is wholly different
from Visual Technology (I), the company for which the Rebers guaranteed payment.
12.

In opposing the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff strongly relies upon Mule-Hide Prods. Co.

v. White, 438 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah App. 2002). In Mule-Hide, the guarantor had not revoked her
guaranty when the company, which was the subject of her guaranty, placed an order from Mule-Hide,

which order was subsequently delivered and accepted.
13.

The facts of this case, and as set forth above, demonstrate that this case is clearly

distinguishable from Mule-Hide. The company whose debts the Rebers guaranteed was not the same
company which in fact ordered and received products from Plaintiff, the debt for which products is the
subject of this action. It was Visual Technology (II), located at Bearcat Drive and whose president
was Mr. Bruce Jackson, that ordered the products from Plaintiff pursuant to an entirely new
Agreement as to which the Rebers were not even a party.
14.

Under the facts alleged in the Complaint and in light of the documents attached to the

Complaint, there is no plausible way that the Rebers can be held liable under the Guaranty.

Accordingly, this Court GRANTS the Rebers' Motion to Dismiss and ORDERS that the relief
therein be granted, to wit, that the Complaint against them be dismissed and that they be awarded their
reasonable attorney's fees of $8,124.00 as has been established by the Affidavit of Elizabeth M. Peck
Regarding Attorney's Fees dated July 8, 2003

DATED this 2 ^ day of

iff
~7!

Leslie A Lewis
Third District Court Judge
State of Utah

Approved as tolFi
SNELL & WILME

David Leta
Kimberly Havlik
Attorneys for Plaintiff

5tM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of June . 2003,1 caused to be mailed, by first class
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER ON MOTION TO
DISMISS to the following:
David Leta
Kimberly Havlik
SNELL & WILMER
15 W. South Temple, Ste. 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
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Rules of Civil Procedure
Q Rules of Civil Procedure
Q PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
[Previous Document in Book]

[Next Document in Book]

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented.
Unless otherwise provided by statute
or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an answer within
twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is
complete within the state and within thirty days after service of
the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party
served with a pleading stating a cross-claim
shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after
the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days
after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs.
The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the
court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in
a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining
claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition
until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be
served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement,
the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the
service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented.
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process,
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7)
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading
is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense
in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by Rule 56.

(c) Motion for judgment
on the pleadings.
After the pleadings are
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party
may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary
hearings.
The defenses specifically enumerated
(l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a
pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in
subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before
trial on application on of any party, unless the court orders that
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the
trial.
(e) Motion for more definite
statement.
If a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive
pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before
interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out
the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion
is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten
days after notice of the order or within such other time as the
court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the
motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion
to strike.
Upon motion made by a party before
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within
twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation
of defenses.
A party who makes a motion under
this rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for
and then available. If a party makes a motion under this
rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then
available which this rule permits to be raised by motion,
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses
or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of
this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses.
A party waives all defenses and
objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply,
except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence
that may have been received.
(i) Pleading

after

denial

of

a motion.

The filing of a responsive

pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these
rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.

(j) Security

for

costs

of a nonresident

plaintiff.

When the

plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a foreign
corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the
plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be
awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by
the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall
order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may
be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.

(k) Effect

of failure

to file

undertaking.

If the plaintiff fails

to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service
of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter
an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective September 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; amended
effective November 1, 2000.)
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Rule 52. Findings b y the court.
(a) Effect.
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment.
Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make
additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The
motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule
59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question has made in the district court an
objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Except in
actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may
be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective January 1, 1987.)
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Q Utah Statutes
Q TITLE 25 FRAUD
Q CHAPTER 5 STATUTE OF FRAUDS
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Certain agreements void unless written and signed.

(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note
or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making of the agreement;
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of
marriage, except mutual promises to marry;
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer
in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or
intestate out of his own estate;
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation; and
(f) every credit agreement.
(2)(a) As used in Subsections

(1)(f) and this Subsection (2):

(i)(A) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by a financial institution
to:
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods,
or things in action;
(II) otherwise extend credit; or
(III) make any other financial accommodation.
(B) "Credit agreement" does not include the usual and customary
agreements related to deposit accounts or overdrafts or other terms
associated with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or
extends a financial accommodation under a credit agreement with a debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or
receives a financial accommodation, under a credit agreement with a
financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means:
(A) a state or federally chartered:

(I) bank;
(II) savings and loan association;
(III) savings bank;
(IV) industrial bank; or
(V) credit union; or
(B) any other institution under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of
Financial Institutions as provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act.
(b)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(e), a debtor or a creditor
may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement:
(A) is in writing;
(B) expresses

consideration;

(C) sets forth the relevant terms and conditions; and
(D) is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the agreement
would be sought.
(ii) For purposes of this act, a signed application constitutes a signed
agreement, if the creditor does not customarily obtain an additional signed
agreement from the debtor when granting the application.
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a credit
agreement is created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of
Subsection (2)(b):
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of
fiduciary or other business relationships.
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly stated typewritten or
printed provision giving notice to the debtor that the written agreement is
a final expression of the agreement between the creditor and debtor and the
written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any alleged oral
agreement. The provision does not have to be on the promissory note or
other evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement.
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature
by the party to be charged if:
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the terms of the
agreement;
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall
constitute acceptance of those terms; and
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor, or a person
authorized by the debtor, requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement
or otherwise uses the credit offered.
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78-27-56.5.
Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover
attorneyf s fees.
A court may award costs and attorney1s fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing
allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
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